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ABSTRACT 
 
The application of international custom in domestic courts is a 
contentious exercise. This paper examined the importance and 
applicability of the principle of non- refoulement in domestic 
courts. Discussion begins with the scrutiny of the formation of 
the principle as international custom. Next, it deals with the 
status of international customary law in the domestic legal 
framework of a dualist state with the analysis of the judicial 
response to attempt to invoke international custom in cases. The 
result shows that there are legal impediments that must be 
removed to enable meaningful application of the principle for 
the benefit of refugees. 
 
Keywords: non-refoulement, refugee, customary international 
law, domestic courts. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The non-refoulement principle is a cornerstone of international 
refugee protection. The principle protects refugees from forced 
return. Under this principle, states are prohibited from rejecting, 
returning or removing refugees and asylum-seekers from their 
jurisdiction to any frontier that will expose them to a threat of 
persecution, or to a real risk of torture, cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment and punishment, or to a threat to life, 
physical integrity and freedom (Chimni, 2000). Protection 
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against return is provided in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees (CRSR) as well as other 
international and regional instruments. For example, Article 5 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 3 
of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (ECHR), Article 7 of the 
International Covenant CCPR, Article 5 (2) of American 
Convention on Human Rights 1969 (ACHR), and Article 5 
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights 1981 (Banjul 
Charter) show common prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment and punishment. 
Scholars argue that the principle has become an 
international custom that binds all state but this is met with some 
opposition and continue to be debated (Lauterpacht & 
Bethlehem, 2003). The argument claims that Malaysia is legally 
bound to adhere to the non-refoulement rule and thus should not 
return any refugee and asylum seekers (Supaat, 2013, 2015). The 
aim of this article is to analyze the applicability of the 
customary rule in the international refugee law in Malaysian 
courts, that is, the principle of non- refoulement. To achieve 
that, it first discusses and analyzes the formation of the rule as 
an international custom but not including the persistent objector 
rule. Next, this article examines the position of international law 
and customs under the Malaysian legal framework to predict the 
applicability of customary international law rules in local courts. 
This involves the examination of primary law and previous case 
laws. 
 
THE FORMATION OF THE NON- REFOULEMENT 
PRINCIPLE AS CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW. 
States have been practicing the rule of non- return even before 
the adoption of the CRSR in 1951. The concept was first 
articulated in international instrument in Article 3 of the 1933 
Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees 
(Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, 2007). It was then codified in 
Article 33 of the CRSR and even though the rule already existed 
in treaty law, it can also exist in the form of international custom 
(North Sea Continental Shelf cases (1969) ICJ Reports 3; 
Nicaragua v United States of America (1984) ICJ Reports 169). 
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In fact, a customary rule can crystallize out of a provision of a 
treaty if it satisfies the three conditions: i) that the rule is 
fundamentally norm-creating character; ii) widespread and 
representative state support including affected states; and iii) 
consistent state practice and general acceptance and recognition 
of the rule (North Sea Continental Shelf cases (1969) ICJ 
Reports 3).  
Two components must be satisfied in the formation of 
customary international law - general practice and acceptance as 
law or opinio juris  (Statute of the International Court of Justice, 
Article 38 (1b) but there is a continuing debate over the of each 
component. For a practice to become ‘customary’, it must be 
constant, uniform and considered mutually obligatory among 
states (Shaw, 2008 & Hathaway, 2005). Uniformity of the 
practice is not absolute but should be substantial, consistent, and 
without significant uncertainty, fluctuation, contradictory 
practice and discrepancy. Furthermore, claims made by states 
without assertive acts do not amount to practice as required. For 
example, in the Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v Norway 
(1951) ICJ Reports 191).  
The first element, the generality of practice, no specific 
number of states can be ascertained or determined but it shall 
take into account the participation of states including the reaction 
of other states towards such practice (Akehurst, 1974). Extensive 
acceptance among states whose interests are particularly affected 
is also vital according to the Internatioanl Court of Justice (ICJ) 
in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v Iceland 
(1974) Merits, ICJ Reports 3). Only general acceptance is 
needed to create customary law, not absolute recognition of a 
practice. Hence, a custom will also state that some states have 
not consented to the rule and do not object to it. Generality could 
require a large majority as in South West Africa `Cases (1966) 
ICJ Reports 291)  and in some cases, generality depends on the 
evidence available for a particular circumstance (Akehurst, 1974; 
Brownlie, 2008 and Kunz, 1953).  
Widespread practice with a representative participation 
among states, for example according to region is good example 
of general acceptance (Tunkin, 1974; Fisheries Jurisdiction Case 
(United Kingdom v Iceland (1974) Merits, ICJ Reports 3; North 
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Sea Continental Shelf cases (1969) ICJ Reports 3. Generality 
does not demand specificity of time or duration (Brownlie, 
2008). Cheng (1965) even suggests that in extreme situations 
where precedents or prior practice are absent, custom could 
emerge instantly. The second component, the opinio juris, 
requires that the practice be accepted and acknowledged as law, 
and that states voluntarily agree to be bound by the ‘law’ 
(Hathaway, 2005).  
In determining the customary status of a rule, the 
traditional and modern custom has different views. They give 
different weights to both elements of state practice and opinio 
juris. The traditional custom makes general and consistent state 
practice as the primary consideration, and derives opinio juris 
from actual state practice. Greater weight is put on action than 
what the state publicly expresses. There are commentators who 
simply reject the opinio juris sive necessitates and rely solely on 
practice (Kelsen,  1952). The modern custom however, puts 
greater importance to states expressions and declaration rather 
than their actual conduct (Roberts, 2001 and Guzman, 2005). 
Their stand is that a state may know that it has obligation under 
some laws but simply act contrary to the rule. This group 
believes that only opinio juris is vital in determining customary 
rules but not general practice since it is possible for customary 
rules to develop instantaneously even though the practice has 
never generally taken place (Cheng, 1965). The relevant proof of 
acceptance as law may include the assurance of policy-makers 
that certain practice is obligatory and has reached customary 
status (Amato, 1971). Thus, contrary action by a state pertaining 
to a rule is unimportant when it has openly expressed the 
obligatory nature of a particular rule.  
The membership of international and regional 
organizations that adopt non- legal documents containing 
provisions of non-refoulement is another general practice 
(Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, 2003). Malaysia is a member state of 
the AALCO, which adopted the Bangkok Principles, a non-
binding document concerning refugees that recognize prohibition 
of forced return. The other practice is states’ incorporation of the 
ratified treaties into municipal laws especially the principle of 
non-refoulement. More than 120 states have incorporated the 
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non-refoulement provisions in their municipal law (Lauterpacht 
& Bethlehem, 2003). Malaysia is not included in the statistic. 
Last but not least is states’ actual practice of not rejecting, 
removing and returning refugees including their practice in 
relation to extradition. Nevertheless, many states do act against 
the principle and justify the breach and violation with security, 
social and economic reasons.  
The rule of opinio juris is taken from a number of state 
expressions and statements including the unanimous view 
conveyed by state representatives during the UN Conference on 
the Status of Stateless Persons, which stated that the provision of 
non- refoulement in the Convention was taken as a 
demonstration and representation of a generally accepted 
principle of non-return (Lauterpacht & Bethlehem 2003). The 
fact that the provision of non-return is embodied in various 
international treaties apart from the CRSR is also an opinio juri. 
Protests and objection by states and UNHCR to any breach of 
the non-refoulement principle or any conduct that amounts to 
refoulement demonstrate sense of legal obligation (Gluck, 1993; 
Coleman, 2003; Bettis, 2011). Lastly, the provision of Article 33 
of the CRSR is considered to have a norm-creating character, the 
foundation of a customary law (North Sea Continental Shelf 
cases (1969) ICJ Reports 3). It is argued that Article 33 satisfies 
all the three prerequisites to become a customary rule as 
identified and applied by the ICJ in the North Sea Continental 
Shelf Case. 
Regardless of the evidence, some commentators dispute 
the customary status. Hathaway (2005) insists that, despite 
decades of refugee problems and acknowledgement of their 
rights under the CRSR, no custom has ever been established, for 
several reasons. Firstly, there is a lack of consistent and uniform 
practice among contracting states (Hathaway, 2005). In this 
regard, several instances can be referred to in establishing the 
negative practices of states, which are contrary to the 
prerequisite of uniform and consistent practice (Colesman, 
2003).  
In concluding that there is no customary law of non-
refoulement, Hailbronner (1985) argues that actual state practice, 
as seen from the asylum laws and actions of Western Europe, the 
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USA and Canada, has constituted contradictory evidence against 
customary status. Secondly, it is claimed that the principle will 
not easily reach customary status because the rule is against 
states’ desire to maintain control over their own borders; in other 
words, it is contrary to states’ idea of sovereignty. The rule will 
impose on states an obligation to accept aliens into their 
territories or will remove states’ powers, while states insist on 
their prerogative to allow or disallow entry. The next counter-
argument contests the sufficiency of clear proof. The attainment 
of customary status is not sufficiently convincing as there is 
inadequate evidence to support the proposal. This argument 
takes into consideration all the inconsistent practice that has been 
occurring for decades to this day. The idea of the customary 
status of the non-refoulement principle and its recognition is 
regarded as wishful legal thinking rather than a careful factual 
and legal analysis (Hailbronner, 1985).  
Proponents of the customary status of the non-
refoulement argue that negative and inconsistent state practice 
should be regarded as violation rather than denial of obligation. 
In Asia, during the Indochina crisis, Thailand, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Singapore and Australia were all criticized for 
rejecting refugees by not allowing their boat to land and 
disembark on their shores. Boats were ask to redirect to other 
destination such as to Indonesia but such redirections according 
to  Manstead (2007)  as not amounting to a violation of the rule 
of non-refoulement if the boats are redirected to a safe country. 
In Australia, the Tampa incident is a modern example of classic 
rejection. A freighter, which rescued Afghanistan refugees on the 
high seas was not allowed to land despite concern over the 
welfare and health of the refugees and the crew (Magner, 2004; 
Willheim, 2003; Edwards 2003).  
Despite continuously asserting that the refugees should 
not be allowed to apply for political refugee status and should 
not enter Australia illegally, Australia never denied its 
responsibility not to refoule the refugees (Willheim, 2003). In 
these cases states’ actions are considered as breaches or 
violations of the rule rather than a denial of obligation under the 
rule of non-refoulement. Another argument to support non-
refoulement as custom is the incorporation of the principle into 
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domestic laws that should be taken as the opinio juris of the 
state. Such move is a demonstration that state has acted out of 
the sense of obligation under the principle of non-refoulement.  
By comparison, there are two significant and consistent 
state practices: first, becoming members of instruments that 
contain non-refoulement principle; and, second, the 
incorporation of the principle of non-refoulement into national 
laws. In addition to that, the number of states that practise the 
rule is greater than the number of states that violates the 
principle. The incompatible practices are insufficient to dismiss 
the consistency and generality of the non-refoulement principle. 
Thus it can be concluded that the principle of non-refoulement 
has become an international custom. 
 
MALAYSIA’S DUTIES UNDER THE CUSTOMARY 
PRINCIPLE OF NON- REFOULEMENT  
Based on discussion by Lauterpacht and Bethlehem (2003), 
Malaysia’s duties and obligation under the rule shall include the 
duty to identify ‘persons’ entitled to the protection of the rule. 
This could involve screening of aliens. The other duty is to 
provide the proper avenue to deal with the exception in the 
application of the protection (Willheim, 2003). Malaysia is 
required to determine that a person is in fact a refugee or 
someone who cannot be returned, thus enabling him/her to claim 
protection under the principle. The determination should be 
carried out by a specific body with a specific function similar to 
refugee status determination (RSD), as practised by contracting 
states to the CRSR which also provide appeal avenue (UKBA, 
2013). However, since the UNHCR in Malaysia is allowed to 
process the application without any control, participation or 
involvement of the government throughout the process, the issue 
is whether the action amounts to the positive discharge of the 
duty? The author argues that the screening and refugee 
determination by the UNHCR is an insufficient discharge of the 
duties under the non-refoulement principle because UNHCR has 
no real legal power to execute its findings.  
In a Hong Kong case, C v. Director of Immigration 
[2013] 4 HKC 563, the applicants sought judicial review against 
the decision of the UNHCR of not recognizing the applicants as 
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refugees and then the refusal upon appeal. They also sought a 
number of declaratory reliefs. It was held by the court in the first 
instance that the principle is a customary international law; but it 
was found to be contradictory to Hong Kong law and thus 
rendering the rule inapplicable in Hong Kong. On appeal to the 
Court of Final Appeal, the court held that refugee screening is a 
duty of state even though UNHCR is already in the territory to 
conduct refugee status determination. It was also acknowledged 
that non- refoulement is a customary international law as was 
decided in the Appeal Court earlier. This case is relevant to the 
present study since Hong Kong and Malaysia are non-parties to 
the CRSR, and both persistently adhere to the policy of not 
granting refugee status, have no provisions for refugee protection 
and handling, and UNHCR fully handles refugee registration and 
determination of application for refugee status. 
 
THE APPLICABILITY OF THE CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW RULES FOR REFUGEES IN 
MALAYSIAN COURTS 
Malaysia has been practising a dualist approach towards 
international law and treaties (Hamid, 2005). In the dualism 
theory, international law and municipal law are two separate 
systems of rules without superiority effect over each other since 
each body of law regulate different subject matter (Shaw, 2008). 
Nevertheless, in practice, dualist states often make laws that 
suppress international law (Shaw, 2008). In dualist state, its 
municipal law cannot be invalidated by international law 
(Fitzmaurice, 1957). The monism theory however, treats 
international law as supreme over national law (Fitzmaurice, 
1957). It considers both laws as a single unit and international 
law is the basic law (Fitzmaurice, 1957) and as a result, 
international law will automatically become part of municipal 
law once accepted (Fitzmaurice, 1957). Nevertheless, even 
though international and national law operate in different 
domain, there are occasions where both laws becomes in conflict 
which caused a state to breach its international obligation while 
acting in accordance with the domestic law (Wallace, 2009). An 
example of this situation is the problem of asylum where state is 
trying to enforce its own law on regulating the admission of 
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immigrant without valid travel document and penalize them for 
immigration offence while the principle of non- refoulement 
prohibit states from rejecting a refugee and the CRSR prohibit 
state from taking criminal action against refugee. In this situation 
the state is liable for the failure to fulfill its obligation under 
international law (Fitzmaurice, 1957).  
 
The Malaysian Federal Constitution does not provide the 
status or the effect of international treaties in Malaysian law and 
its legal framework (Hamid, 2005). The Constitution declares 
that it is the supreme law of the land and that any law passed 
after Merdeka Day which is inconsistent with the Constitution 
shall to the extent of the inconsistencies be void (Malaysian 
Federal Constitution, Article 4 (1)). Article 4 (1) of the 
Constitution is silent regarding international law but only 
provides that where the Constitution is in conflict with other 
statutes, the Constitution shall prevail. The Constitution also 
identifies specific powers of the Parliament to make laws in 
respect of matters concerning Malaysia’s relation with other 
countries and international organizations as provided under 
Article 74 (1) read together with the Ninth Schedule.  
 
The Parliament has to incorporate provisions of treaties, 
agreements and conventions into written legislation before it can 
be applied in Malaysian courts. The executive authority is 
empowered to administer and to implement matters, which fall 
under the authority of the Parliament (Federal Constitution, 
Article 80). A number of Parliamentary statutes have been 
enacted to give effect to international treaties such as  the 
Geneva Conventions Act 1962 (Act 512) (Revised 1993) which 
adopted provisions of the four Geneva Conventions for the 
Protection of the Victims of War or 1949; the Diplomatic 
Privileges (Vienna Convention) Act 1966 (Act 636) (Revised 
2004) that gives legal effect to the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations 1961; and the International Organizations 
(Privileges and Immunities) Act 1992 (Act 485) that gives legal 
effect to the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the 
United Nations 1946. However, these have not yet fulfilled the 
obligation to implement some other treaties. Only selected 
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provisions of the treaties are consolidated and incorporated into 
Malaysian laws such as the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC). 
 
It is important to determine the application of customary 
international law, an unwritten law that binds Malaysia without 
no state consent and ratification. Even if the court can be 
convinced that the rule is an international custom, can a refugee 
be able to claim the right not to be returned under the non- 
refoulement principle in local courts? In the case of  C v. 
Director of Immigration [2008] HKCU 256 the Court of Appeal 
recognised the right of refugees under customary norm of non- 
refoulement and this provide a locus standi for the refugee to 
claim their rights in the courts. Questions on how exactly 
customary international law can be applied and the extent of its 
legality as a source of law in the country have not sufficiently 
addressed both academically and judicially. Very limited journal 
articles and case laws discussed this matters including Dickstein 
(1974).  
 
It is suggested that customary international law is 
applicable in Malaysia if it is regarded as part and parcel of the 
common law by virtue of Section 3 (1) of Civil Law Act 1956 
(Revised 1972) (Hamid, 2005). Local courts are bound to apply 
common law and the law of equity as administered in England 
on the 7 April 1956 (for Peninsular Malaysia); 1 December 1951 
(for Sabah); and 12 December 1949 (in the case of Sarawak) 
depending on the suitability of the law to local circumstances. It 
has been argued and confirmed in many English cases that the 
customary international law form parts of English common law 
and thus, customary international law could also be applied in 
Malaysia for the same reason.  
 
In Buvot v Barbuit (1737) Cas. Temp. Talbot 281, Lord 
Talbot declares the court’s recognition of international law as 
law in England by stating that: ‘the law of nations in its full 
extent was part of the law of England’. After that, in Triquet v 
Bath (1764) 3 Burr 1478, Lord Mansfield agreed with the 
declaration made in Buvot v Barbuit (Shaw, 2008; Harris 1998). 
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In a Chung Chi Cheung v R [1939] AC 160 or Chung Chi 
Cheung v The King [1939] 1 MLJ 1, Lord Atkin asserts that the 
courts will only apply international law which has been 
expressly accepted by English law and as for customary 
international law, it will be valid if it is consistent with written 
law and previous decisions of the courts. Later, Trendtex 
Trading Corporation v Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] 2 WLR 
356 and Maclaine Watson v Department of Trade and Industry 
[1988] 3 WLR 1033 confirmed and reaffirmed the employment 
of the doctrine of incorporation as the correct approach in 
deciding the acceptance of customary international law rules into 
English law. These cases demonstrate that the application of 
customary international law in England is firmly founded on the 
doctrine of incorporation in which the rules are accepted and 
recognised by the courts provided that they are not in conflict 
with any statute of the Parliament or decisions of the highest 
court. Nonetheless, the application is limited by the rule that the 
court shall not take the role of the Parliament to create criminal 
sanctions (R v Jones and Others [2006] UKHL 16, [2006] 2 All 
ER 741). 
 
In Malaysian context, the status of customary 
international law as a component of English law could be viewed 
as part of the common law which is applicable in the country as 
far as the rules are not in conflict with Malaysian law, public 
policy and local circumstances (Hamid, 2005). However, the 
application of customary international law in domestic court is 
still an ambiguous issue due to the very limited judicial 
consideration. In the case of PP v Wah Ah Jee (1919) 2 
F.M.S.L.R. 193, the court stated that it is the courts’ duty to take 
the law as it is or as they find it and thus, whether a written law 
is contrary to international law should not be considered.  
 
In Olofsen v Govt. Of Malaysia [1966] 2 MLJ 300, the 
Singapore High Court applied a customary rule of state 
sovereignty despite no explanation was made on how did the rule 
is accepted into domestic legal framework. In PP v Oei Hee Koi 
[1968] 1 MLJ 148, the Privy Council held that the customary 
international law as stated in the Oppenheim’s International Law 
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(Vol. 11 7th Ed) applied to the accused. It was also held that 
provisions of the Geneva Convention have not abrogated the rule 
of customary international law yet again, the extent to which 
customary international law shall be applied in Malaysia was not 
explained.  
 
On the contrary, the court in PP v Narogne Sookpavit 
[1987] 2 MLJ 100, found the accused guilty of an offence under 
section 11(1) of the Fisheries Act 1963 (Revised 1979). The 
court rejected the defence council’s argument that ‘the right to 
innocent passage’ has become customary international law and 
thus, is part of Malaysian law and therefore, the respondents 
should be able to enjoy the right of innocent passage. According 
to Shanker J, the court is obliged to consider evidence that a 
particular custom really exist before endorsing its existence 
(Evidence Act 1950, Section 13) and held that the right to 
innocent passage as a customary international law is not proved. 
The court further held that even if it can be proved that an 
innocent passage is indeed a right, it cannot be applied and 
upheld as it is contrary to Malaysian statute particularly 
Regulation 3(b) of the Fisheries (Maritime) Regulations 1967.  
 
This judgement is an example where the court is capable 
of rejecting the existence of a customary rule by citing a 
contradictory written law. Here, the Fisheries Act 1963 puts an 
obstacle to the application of the customary rule in domestic 
courts. It also shows that in order to establish the existence of an 
international custom, the Evidence Act 1950 must be closely 
adhered to (Evidence Act 1950, Section 45). This case also 
declares the supremacy of domestic laws over customary 
international law. 
 
However, the case of Village Holdings Sdn. Bhd. v Her 
Majesty The Queen in Right of Canada [1988] 2 MLJ 656 
depicts a different decision. Shanker J held that Malaysia by 
virtue of section 3 of the Civil Law Act 1956, Malaysia is bound 
by the doctrine of absolute state immunity a common law of 
England. He also refers to the fact that “the common law of 
England as administered in England on April 7, 1956 was that 
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the immunity from legal process accorded to a foreign sovereign 
was absolute”. The case of Mighell v Sultan of Johore [1894] 1 
QB 149 and Duff Development Company Limited v Kelantan 
Government & Anor [1924] AC 797 are also illustrative of this 
point. It was argued that court’s recognition of the sovereign 
immunity principle demonstrates that since the rule is also a 
recognized as customary international law it impliedly points out 
that when Malaysian courts accept it as common it also means 
the acceptance of the rule as customary rule by the Malaysian 
courts (Hamid, 2005).  
 
The decision shows that the acceptance of common law 
is still subject to confirmation that it is a common law of 
England that is being administered as at April 7, 1956 since at 
that time, the common law of England on sovereign immunity 
has changed and developed to restrictive immunity as in the case 
of Trendtex. This is the position if the provision of Section 3 of 
the Civil Law Act 1956 is to be strictly applied. It means that any 
developments in the common law of England after the cut -off 
date of April 7, 1956 cannot be applied in Malaysia (Hamid, 
2005). In this situation, the legislature is the proper forum to 
update the development of the common law by enacting new 
laws.  
 
Nevertheless, the real situation in Malaysia is somewhat 
different than the theoretical understanding of Section 3 of the 
Civil Law Act 1956. The restrictions is ignored in some 
instances and observed at other times. For example, in the case 
of Saad Marwi v Chan Hwan Hua & Anor [2001] 3 CLJ 98, 
Gopal Sri Ram JCA asserts that after 1956, the judiciary are at 
liberty to shape the way the common law of England are to be 
applied in Malaysian courts Thus, he chose to apply the English 
doctrine of unconscionable bargain developed in England after 
1956 through Section 3 of the Civil Law Act. On the contrary, 
the case of Majlis Perbandaran Ampang Jaya v Steven Phoa 
Cheng Loon & Ors [2006] 3 MLJ 389, was treated differently. 
Abdul Hamid Muhammad Federal Court Judge (FCJ) in dealing 
with the question whether common law developed after 1956 
should be followed states that: 
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“[30] Strictly speaking, when faced with the situation whether a 
particular principle of common law of England is applicable, 
first, the court has to determine whether there is any written law 
in force in Malaysia. If there is, the court does not have to look 
anywhere else. If there is none, then the court should determine 
what is the common law administered in England on 7 April 
1956, in the case of West Malaysia. Having done that the court 
should consider whether “local circumstances” and “local 
inhabitants” permit its application, as such. If it is 
“permissible” the court should apply it. If not, in my view, the 
court is free to reject it totally or adopt any part which is 
“permissible”, with or without qualification. Where the court 
rejects it totally or in part, then the court is free to formulate 
Malaysia’s own common law. In so doing, the court is at liberty 
to look at other sources, local or otherwise, including the 
common law of England after 7 April 1956 and principles of 
common law in other countries.” 
 
Abdul Hamid Muhammad FCJ is of the view that 
Malaysian courts can choose to apply the common law of 
England developed after 1956 if no common law before that date 
is found for a specific matter. He also acknowledges that the 
application of the common has sometimes failed to follow the 
correct approach as provided by the Civil Law Act 1956. He 
further asserts that: 
 
“[31] In practice, lawyers and judges do not usually approach 
the matter that way. One of the reasons, I believe, is the difficulty 
in determining the common law of England as administered in 
England on that date. Another reason which may even be more 
dominant, is that both lawyers and judges alike do not see the 
rational of Malaysian courts applying “archaic” common law of 
England which reason, in law, is difficult to justify. As a result, 
quite often, most recent developments in the common law of 
England are followed without any reference to the said 
provision. However, this is not to say that judges are not aware 
or, generally speaking, choose to disregard the provision. Some 
do state clearly in their judgments the effects of that provision.” 
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In the above case the Federal Court applies “…the old 
common law authorities which limited the claim for pure 
economic loss in cases of negligence, in particular severely 
limiting such claims against a local authority” (Syed Ahmad, 
2012).  
 
The application of the doctrine of absolute state 
immunity is also reviewed by the Supreme Court in 
Commonwealth of Australia v Midford (Malaysian) Sdn Bhd. 
[1990] 1 CLJ 878, [1990] 1 MLJ 475. Gunn Chit Tuan SCJ in 
answering whether absolute state immunity applies admits the 
applicability of the restrictive immunity rule through English 
common law that developed after 1956 as reflected in the case of 
Philippine Admiral (1977) AC 373, Trendtex (1977) 2 WLR 356 
and The 'I Congreso' case (1983) 1 AC 244 but  the court is 
silent of the status of the immunity rule as customary 
international law. It is more concern with the question of 
whether or not the rule has been made part of common law of 
England. Moreover, the court further asserts the principles in the 
application of common law in Malaysia: first, the court is at 
liberty to adopt the approach of applying common law rule that 
suits the legal needs of the country; and second, the Parliament 
has the power to enact a legislation which may be inconsistent 
with common law and thus, will have effect on the applicability 
of that rule.  
 
The Malaysian cases referred to argue that there were 
not enough clarification on the formation of the custom, and 
second, that there are inconsistencies in the onus of proof of this 
matter. In some cases the court insisted that the defence or the 
party who asserts the existence of such rule made insufficient 
effort to prove that a particular customary rule exists (PP v 
Narogne Sookpavit [1987] 2 MLJ 100). In other cases, the court 
takes extra mile to show that a customary rule in question is a 
recognised rule in international law and thus applicable in local 
disputes such as in Olofsen.  
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Three main principles are identified in the application of 
customary international law in its domestic courts: first, the rule 
can be applied if it can be considered as Common Law. Second, 
the rule is not inconsistent with any written law, and third, the 
duty to prove a custom lies with the party who wants to invoke it 
(Benvenisti 1993).  
 
To prove that the principle of non-refoulement is a 
common law, we have to look at the practice of English 
Courts in relation to non- return. In discussing the rights and 
protection of refugee, reference is always made to the CRSR 
and UK’s obligation under it as a contracting state.  The UK 
signed the CRSR on 28 July 1951 and ratified it on 11 March 
1954. As a signatory to the CRSR, its regulation regarding 
asylum in the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993 
incorporates provisions of CRSR (Nazarova 2002). UK is 
also a party to the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) and its provisions are adopted into the Human 
Rights Act 1998 and the protection against return or non- 
refoulement is provided under Article 3 of the Human Rights 
Act 1998.  
 
Without evidence supporting the position of non-
refoulement as a common law, the rule cannot be applied in 
Malaysia via common law route. Even if the principle cannot 
be proved to be a common law, this study is of the view that 
the court is still open to follow the written law of England to 
some extent because the situation of refugee is not dealt with 
in Malaysian law and there is a lacuna. Thus, can the court 
refer to the written law of England on non- return, since the 
Civil Law Act 1956 only warrant the application of common 
law? In the case of Chan Ah Moi v Phang Wai Ann [1995] 3 
CLJ 846, the High Court, relying on the provision of Section 
3, Civil law Act 1956, allows the application to exclude the 
husband from a matrimonial home based on the British 
Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976 
since no provisions dealing with such application is provided 
in any written law in Malaysia (Chan Ah Moi v Phang Wai 
Ann [1995] 3 CLJ 846).  
MJSL | DECEMBER 2017 | VOL 6  
ISSN : 1985-7454 | E-ISSN : 2590-4396 
www.mjsl.usim.edu.my  
 
 
40 
 
 
Later, however, in the case of Jayakumari v Suriya 
Narayanan [1996] 1 LNS 74 James Foong J. stated that the 
case of Chan Ah Moi was wrongly decided as it relies on the 
written law when it is not provided under the Civil Law Act 
1956. In other words, the written law should not bind 
Malaysia. He insists that the cut- off date should be complied 
with regardless of the absence of law. In deciding the case 
before him, he relies on several other English cases not 
referred to by the earlier case (Jayakumari v Suriya 
Narayanan [1996] 1 LNS 74).  
 
The principle of customary international law accepted as 
common law in Malaysia is applicable provided that they are not 
inconsistent with any written law (statutes or Acts of Parliament) 
or decisions of the highest court. This is also the practice of 
many other states. What is not firmly established is the extent to 
which such inconsistency should takes effect or how much 
inconsistency is required before a principle of customary 
international law can be found void and thus entirely 
inapplicable in Malaysian courts. Section 5 of the Malaysian 
Immigration Act 1959/63 provides that it is an offence for 
anyone to enter and leave Malaysia through unauthorized 
entry points and to enter and stay in Malaysia without valid 
permit. The penalty for such offences includes fines and 
whipping and also removal and deportation (Immigration Act 
1959/63, Section 6). These provisions is contrary to the non- 
refoulement principle that prohibits states to return an 
asylum seeker or refugee to a territory where there is a risk 
of being persecuted and when he/ she has no valid travel 
document or has entered a country illegally, penalty should 
not be imposed.  
 
From one perspective, this inconsistency can be used 
by the authority to deny its obligation. The provisions of the 
Immigration Act 1959/63 may be used to invalidate any 
attempt to invoke the principle of non- refoulement in 
Malaysian courts. If the court is to follow the finding in 
Norogne, there is a possibility that the principle of non- 
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refoulement will be a futile method to protect refugees from 
deportation or removal from Malaysia. On the contrary, this 
study is of the view that laws which are deemed to be 
inconsistent with customary rule should be fully scrutinized to 
determine their effect.  
 
The idea that a customary international law cannot be 
applied at all when an inconsistent domestic law is present is 
unacceptable. Such notion will result in defeating international 
law by manipulating provisions of domestic laws rather than 
utilizing the rules on state obligation and responsibilities for the 
benefit of marginalized population. It is suggested that courts 
should clearly outline the degree of inconsistency between a 
particular customary rule and the domestic law or even court’s 
decision and specify the implication of such inconsistency. An 
inconsistent legal provision should only have limited 
restriction effect on the principle of non- refoulement. It 
should not invalidate the whole principle or its contents. It 
should only become invalid to the extent of the inconsistency. 
This understanding is in parallel with provision of the 
Federal Constitution that limit the effect of inconsistent law 
with the Constitution. 
 
CONCLUSION 
There are conclusive legal evidence to show that customary 
international law is theoretically applicable in Malaysian courts 
because of its common law status. However, to convince the 
court of the existence of the customary rule of non- refoulement 
and it is a common law of England during the cut- off date is a 
complicated task. There is a possibility that the non- refoulement 
principle can be applied by the courts if the court is willing to 
adopt a liberal approach as in Saad Marwi and Chan Ah Moi. 
Nevertheless, if the court approaches it from restrictive point of 
view as in Majlis Perbandaran Ampang Jaya v Steven Phoa 
Cheng Loon & Ors [2006] 3 MLJ 389 or refuse to address a 
lacuna in domestic law, customary international law will have no 
place in local courts. It was shown that the Malaysian judiciary is 
reluctant to use and apply customary international law in the 
adjudication of domestic disputes except for a limited number of 
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established rules such as the diplomatic immunity. Reasons for 
not allowing the customary international law to take effect lie 
with the argument that a particular rule has not been sufficiently 
proved as custom and or that there are existing municipal laws 
that inhibit its operation domestically. This study implies that the 
effort to apply international custom in domestic courts will 
continue to be challenged. It also implies that the legal 
impediments could be removed if the authority is willing to 
amend and reform the immigration law with refugee protection 
in mind.  
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